

Message Text

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O 071530Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3229

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 0111

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS/ARA FROM CRIMMINS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) BR

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT BY SECRETARY TO BRAZIL

1. GENERAL: I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE HIS LONG-POSTPONED VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM A FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCE THAT DURING THE PARIS BILATERAL THE SECRETARY STATED TO SILVEIRA THAT A THURSDAY TO SUNDAY TRIP TO BRASILIA AND RIO IN EARLY FEBRUARY WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT BEEN VOUCHSAFED ANY SUCH DETAIL BY THE DEPARTMENT, THE ITAMARATY SOURCE IS, AS THEY SAY, WELL-PLACED AND WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS. THEREFORE, I AM GOING ON THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT (A) THE SECRETARY DOES INTEND TO VISIT; (B) THE VISIT MAY TAKE PLACE RATHER SOON; AND (C) THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VISIT WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT PROPOSED EARLIER.

2. ATMOSPHERE FOR THE VISIT: BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED DELAYS IN THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL, THE PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE FOR A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY HAS BECOME COOLER, BUT THE OFFICIAL RECEPΤIVITY HAS PROBABLY NOT DECLINED APPRECIABLY. IN SILVEIRA'S CASE, IT MAY EVEN HAVE GONE UP BECAUSE OF THE UTILITY TO HIM, IN HIS CURRENT DEFENSIVE POSITION, OF THE SECRETARY'S PRESENCE. PRESIDENT GEISEL, WHO HAS NOT BEEN EXEMPT FROM THE CRITICISM DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, MAY SHARE SILVEIRA'S ATTITUDE AND MAY

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WANT TO ASSURE HIS CONSERVATIVE BUSINESS AND MILITARY

CONSTITUENCIES THAT RELATIONS WITH US ARE SOLID. THUS,
THERE MAY BE A MUFFLING ON THE BRAZILIAN SIDE OF "POLITICAL"
DIFFERENCES WITH US. (THE ACERBITY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES
WILL REMAIN.)

3. CONCEPT OF THE VISIT AND ITS OBJECTIVES: THE GENERAL APPROACH THAT THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS FOR THE PROSPECTIVE VISIT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT SET OUT IN THE SEVERAL TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS FROM BRASILIA THAT WERE PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE ABORTED APRIL VISIT. I INVITE ATTENTION PARTICULARLY TO PARAS 1-4 OF BRASILIA 2224 AND BRASILIA 3038. ALTHOUGH THE CONCEPTUAL BASE DESCRIBED IN THOSE TELEGRAMS REMAINS VALID, THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD, IN THE U.S. AND IN BRAZIL IN THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS THAT HAVE MODIFIED THE DETAILED APPLICATION OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES COMPOSING THAT BASE. I REFER TO SUCH THINGS, GENERAL AND SPECIFIC, AS THE CONTINUATION OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY; OUR DEFINITION AT THE SEVENTH SSGA OF A POLICY TOWARD THE DEVELOPING WORLD, ONE WHICH THE GOB CONSIDERS POSITIVE BUT MODEST AND HEDGED; THE WIDENING DEBATE IN THE U.S. OVER DETENTE AND ITS EFFECTS ON A GOB THAT IS ALERT TO SIGNS OF THE WANING OR WAXING OF THE U.S. WILL AND CAPACITY TO LEAD; VERY LITTLE PROGRESS IN THE MTN'S; U.S.- BRAZILIAN DIFFERENCES IN THE UN AND ON ANGOLA; THE SHARP QUESTIONING WITHIN BRAZIL OF SILVEIRA'S CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY; THE SETTING-UP OF THE ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP AND THE MEETING OF ITS TRADE SUB-GROUP; THE AGGRAVATION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN US OVER TRADE ISSUES; THE IMPASSE IN U.S.-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD; THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF OUR GSP; AND THE COMPLETION OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DRAFT COFFEE AGREEMENT.

THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

A. FOR US, THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVE OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH UNAMBIGUOUSLY OUR IDENTIFICATION WITH BRAZIL'S ASPIRATIONS AND OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THEM. WE SHOULD USE THE VISIT TO ALLAY SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE OPOSED TO BRAZIL'S ASCENT. WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT WE CONSIDER BRAZILIAN ACHIEVEMENT OF STATUS AS A RESPONSIBLE WORLD POWER TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR LONG-
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TERM INTERESTS. WE SHOULD GET ACROSS THE COROLLARY POINTS THAT IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL WE ARE GUIDED BY THE RECOGNITION OF BRAZIL'S CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPORTANCE AND WE ARE INTERESTED IN FACILITATING ITS ADVANCE WHERE WE CAN.

IN GIVING EXPRESSION TO THAT KEY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FORMS DURING THE VISIT, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC BRAZILIAN

INTERESTS, OUR BELIEF IN THEIR LONG-TERM CONGRUENCE WITH OUR OWN, AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST TO THEM DOES NOT MEAN A FREE UPWARD RIDE FOR BRAZIL. WE EXPECT BRAZIL TO RECOGNIZE AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR BASIC INTERESTS AND OUR BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE WORLD THAT QUALIFY OUR CAPACITY TO BE FULLY RESPONSIVE TO BRAZILIAN DEMANDS. WE UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT BRAZIL'S DESIRES FOR INDEPENDENCE, BUT NO NATION IN THIS INTERDEPENDENT WORLD CAN ANY LONGER LAY CLAIM TO UNTRAMMELED FREEDOM OF ACTION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 0111

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B. A SECOND OBJECTIVE OF THE VISIT SHOULD BE, THEN, TO SHARPEN BRAZILIAN AWARENESS THAT RISING STATUS BRINGS WITH IT INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, THE INFLUENCE THAT COMES WITH STATUS SHOULD BE USED IN CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS HARMONIOUS WITH BRAZIL'S HISTORIC "WESTERN" VISION AND WITH ITS FUTURE AS A DEVELOPED ECONOMY. (IN OUR OWN THINKING, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO OVERESTIMATE BRAZIL'S CURRENT INFLUENCE, BUT THERE IS NO PARTICULAR HARM, AND PERHAPS SOME TACTICAL BENEFIT, IN EXAGGERATING IT TO THE BRAZILIANS.)

C. A THIRD OBJECTIVE, WHICH OVERLAPS THE FIRST AND SECOND, IS TO ELICIT FROM GEISEL, SILVEIRA AND GOLBERY A COHERENT STATEMENT OF THEIR VIEW OF THE ROLE OF BRAZIL IN THE WORLD NOW AND OVER THE NEXT DECADE. WITHIN THE USG WE HAVE OUR OWN IDEAS -- SOME OF THEM DIVERGENT -- OF BRAZIL'S APPRECIATION OF THE WORLD AND ITS PLACE IN IT NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. TO SEEK FROM THE KEY BRAZILIAN INTERLOCUTORS A CLEAR EXPRESSION OF THEIR WORLD VIEW

WOULD BE COURTEOUS AND FLATTERING TO THEM AND INSTRUCTIVE
FOR US.

D. A FOURTH OBJECTIVE IS TO ESTABLISH IN BRAZILIAN
MINDS THE WISDOM, RESPONSIBILITY AND VIGOR OF U.S.
LEADERSHIP. AS PART OF THEIR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT US WILL
AND CAPACITY, INFLUENTIAL SECTORS OF THE GOB AND PUBLIC
OPINION TEND TO HAVE EITHER A SIMPLISTIC OR CYNICAL VIEW
OF DETENTE (SEE BRASILIA 2639 TRANSMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE APRIL VISIT) AND PRIVATE -- AND PUBLIC -- EXPLANATIONS
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BY THE SECRETARY IN THE FLESH WILL HAVE VERY MUCH GREATER
EFFECT THAN ANY AMOUNT OF WORK BY USIS AND THE EMBASSY.
(A SPEECH ON DETENTE TO THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
WOULD BE A GRABBER.)

4. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OR SPECIAL CARE AND ATTENTION:
I BELIEVE THAT, IN THE PURSUIT OF THESE OBJECTIVES, THE
SECRETARY SHOULD NOT SUCCUMB TO SILVEIRA'S PRESSURE FOR
AN ACKNOWLEDGED "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP". MY REASONS ARE
SET FORTH IN MY SEPTEMBER 8 MEMO TO YOU. THEY ARE JUST
AS VALID NOW AS THEY WERE THEN, PROBABLY EVEN MORE SO
BECAUSE OF THE WORSENING ECONOMIC POSITION OF BRAZIL AND,
IN A FINE POTENTIAL EXAMPLE OF THE DESCENDING-SPIRAL EFFECT,
THE POSSIBILITY OF RETALIATORY SECTION BY US AGAINST THE
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GOB TO TRY TO ALLEVIATE THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS SITUATION (SEE THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SIMON'S
DECEMBER 18 LETTER TO SIMONSEN ANDOUR REPORT OF SIMONSEN'S
REACTION IN BRASILIA 10928). THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, WHICH I WOULD EXPECT TO
BE ONE OF THF TWO MOST CONCRETE RESULTS OF THE VISIT (THE
OTHER BEING AGREEMENT ON DATES FOR A VISIT BY GEISEL),
WILL BE AN EARNEST OF OUR SPECIAL ATTENTION AND REGARD FOR
BRAZIL THAT SHOULD ADEQUATELY MEET SILVEIRA'S NEEDS.
(ON THIS POINT, OUR RELIABLE ITAMARATY SOURCE ALSO STATED,
WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AMUSEMENT, THAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID
THAT HIS STAFF HAD OPPOSED THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM. I
FIND THE REPORT HARD TO CREDIT, KNOWING MY OWN RECOMMENDATIONS
AND THOSE OF ARA, BUT PERHAPS I MISSED SOME OF THE
INFIGHTING. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE REPORT IS
CURRENT IN ITAMARATY.)

5. AGENDA: WHEN THE DEPARTMENT DESIRES THEM, WE WILL
SEND UP OUR IDEAS ON SPECIFIC ITEMS TO BE TAKEN UP DURING
THE VISIT. FOR THE MOMENT I WILL SAY ONLY THAT (A) AT
PRESENT I SEE NO MAJOR NEW INITIATIVES AVAILABLE FOR THE
SECRETARY IN BRAZIL, THIS IN CONTRAST TO THE MORE FLUID
SITUATION BEFORE THE PROPOSED APRIL VISIT (SEE BRASILIA
2224 ETC.); (B) NEVERTHELESS, THE VISIT CAN BE HIGHLY
SUBSTANTIVE; (C) THE BRAZILIAN SIDE WILL BE INSISTENT ON

DISCUSSING ECONOMIC, AND ESPECIALLY TRADE, QUESTIONS AND
WILL NOT BE FOBBED OFF ON THE ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE
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GROUP AND ITS TRADE SUBGROUP: AND (D) IT WOULD BE
USEFUL FOR YOU TO CONSULT BRASILIA 10612 FOR BILATERAL
MATTERS THAT MIGHT LEND THEMSELVES TO ACTION OR DISCUSSION
DURING THE VISIT.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: I WOULD EXPECT THAT THE
TENTATIVE SCHEDULES LAID OUT FOR THE APRIL TRIP WILL BE A
PATTERN. THE SECRETARY SHOUL SEE ESSENTIALLY ALL THE
PERSONS PROPOSED AT THAT TIME. THE APRIL SCHEDULE
PROVIDED AMPLE TIME FOR SERIOUS EXCHANGES.

7. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN WE CAN START TO WORK ON THE
PREPARATIONS AND WHAT YOU WANT FROM US WHEN.

8. FINALLY, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE MAKE NO
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VISIT UNTIL WE ARE CERTAIN THAT IT WILL
TAKE PLACE. ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT WOULD BE CLOSE TO
INTOLERABLE FOR THE BRAZILIANS.

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